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Abstract
This essay examines the heterogeneous process of browsing por-
nography online. It begins with a discussion of the way in which 
our experiences of leisure and duration occur concomitantly and 
simultaneously. In these instances, the temporally linear experience 
of duration becomes disrupted by moments of immersion into a 
pleasurable activity. A discussion of immersion necessarily address-
es the discourse of “disembodiment” among some digital scholars. 
Through formal analysis guided by existential phenomenology, this 
conceptual essay offers a new critical vocabulary, specifically, “dif-
fused embodiment,” as a more befitting alternative for describing 
our temporal and spatial experience of immersion. In the process, 
this essay examines the ways in which the habits of engaging with the 
material apparatus of computer technologies and the productively 
limited narrative framework of online pornography help constitute 
a heterogeneous and nonlinear temporal experience in the process 
of browsing online pornography.
Introduction
While the myth of the internet promises immediate gratification, the inter-
face of online pornography necessitates delays: logging on, finding a site, 
clicking through, the delay of loading thumbnails, and the delay of waiting 
for a selected image, series of images, or moving image to appear. High-
speed internet access may decrease this delay, but, as Patterson has found, 
“cyberporn constantly pushes the boundaries of bandwidth; as soon as the 
technology can immediately deliver full-frame images, streaming video 
comes on offer, with slower load times. Even with a high-speed connection, 
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there is still often delay on the side of the site delivering content.” Waiting 
and looking thus become habit, thereby “inscribing repetition and delay 
as pleasures of a different order” (Patterson 2004, 109). At some point 
there is a limit to the amount of waiting a viewer will endure before their 
browsing experience becomes frustrating, but until that threshold, delay 
might be said to intensify the pleasure of eventual visibility.1
This essay examines the heterogeneous process of browsing pornog-
raphy online. It begins with a discussion of the way in which our experi-
ences of leisure and duration occur concomitantly and simultaneously. 
In these instances, the temporally linear experience of duration becomes 
disrupted by moments of immersion into a pleasurable activity. A discus-
sion of immersion necessarily addresses the discourse of “disembodi-
ment” among some digital scholars. Through formal analysis guided by 
existential phenomenology, this conceptual essay offers a new critical vo-
cabulary, specifically, “diffused embodiment,” as a more befitting alterna-
tive for describing our temporal and spatial experience of immersion. In 
the process, this essay examines the ways in which the habits of engaging 
with the material apparatus of computer technologies and the produc-
tively limited narrative framework of online pornography help constitute 
a heterogeneous and nonlinear temporal experience in the process of 
browsing online pornography.
Temporal Factors
Research on leisure activities, part of everyday life information-seeking 
scholarship, has emphasized the conjoined themes of time and pleasure 
as part of what constitutes leisureliness. A defining feature of leisureliness 
is the duration of opportunity to participate in a pleasurable activity. In 
her study of serious leisure activities, Hartel (2007, 236) rejects Bates’s 
assertion (2005, 4) that the Principle of Least Effort is the most solid re-
sult in all of information-seeking research by emphasizing the significant 
time and effort hobbyists put into their searches. This is especially true of 
people who derive pleasure from a hard-to-find object, such as the stamp 
collector, baseball card collector, bibliophile, or genealogist (Case 2002). 
Similarly, Spink, Ozmutlu, and Lorence found searching for pornography 
online accounts for more time and effort on the part of users than any 
other type of search (2004).
Time, as an abstract philosophical construct, has rarely been discussed 
in information studies. The dearth of analysis about time perhaps owes to 
the ambiguity of what constitutes time and temporality. Pause for a while, 
for example, over “abstract temporalities” in Heidegger (2009) and Hegel 
(1977), and you quickly grasp how fraught philosophical time becomes, 
often leading to complicated questions of ontology. Yet time has been far 
from absent within information-seeking scholarship. Savolainen has de-
scribed it as “one of the main contextual factors of information seeking” 
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(2006, 110). Savolaninen identifies three ways in which time has been dis-
cussed within information-seeking scholarship: as a fundamental attribute 
of situation and context, as a qualifier of access to information, and as a 
factor that specifies information seeking as a process (2006, 112).
“First,” writes Savolaninen, “time may be conceptualized as a funda-
mental attribute of situation or context of information seeking” (2006, 
112). Scholarship that conceives time in this way has criticized previous 
assumptions of information seeking as a process characterized by moving 
and evolving through time and space—from a past to a present, from a 
present to a future (Kari and Savolainen 2003). Others have criticized 
an assumption of temporal context as a kind of container, a space where 
phenomena resides and activity takes place, constrained by certain contex-
tual boundaries (Dervin 1997). Instead, many scholars have argued that 
information seeking changes over time, depending on an emergent and 
fluid context of browsing. For example, some scholars have shown the way 
in which detailed information may be avoided or deferred if there is no 
immediate need for the information (Chatman 1991). Others have shown 
that time within everyday life information activities may be a matter of 
routine or habit, such as reading the newspaper or watching the weather 
forecast in the morning (Savolainen 1995). Other scholars have shown the 
ways in which information-seeking environments have been temporarily 
formed by a particular group of people to perform a particular task (Petti-
grew 1999). Still others have shown a managerial imperative that pervades 
keeping track of time in everyday activities (McKenzie and Davies 2012). 
All of these, according to Savolainen (1995), are examples of temporal 
factors as attributes of situation and context.
Information-seeking scholarship has also conceived of temporal factors 
as qualifiers of access to information. Scholarship of this sort often con-
ceives of time as a scarce resource that constrains access to information. 
Scholars tend to focus on how quickly people need information (Case 
2002, 35), the significance of time affordance (Edmunds and Morris 
2000), the way time organizes an activity (Hartel 2010), and the relation-
ship between quality of sources and accessibility (Hardy 1982). The con-
straint of time, according to Savolainen, “reduces an individual’s chances 
to access and use information” (2006, 116). While these descriptions may 
assume time always negatively affects information access, Savolainen ad-
mits that “in some cases, time pressure may have beneficial consequences 
because it compels the information seeker to make compromises by con-
centrating on a few sources that may prove ‘good enough’ answers to his 
or her questions” (2006, 116).
Finally, information-seeking scholarship has conceived of temporal fac-
tors as qualifiers of the information-seeking process. Typically, this schol-
arship either expresses information seeking as a chronological process 
or a nonlinear cycling and recycling. The chronological descriptions of 
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information seeking analyze those information activities that are problem- 
and object-oriented. In this understanding, information seeking consumes 
time until a particular information objective has been met, which may or 
may not be constrained by a lack of time. Marcia Bates’s “berrypicking” 
model (1989) implies a temporal factor by describing the sequence by 
which one picks different information sources, suggesting that searching 
or browsing processes occur a bit-at-a-time. Similar studies conceive of the 
process of information seeking as a feedback loop, in which seeking fol-
lows a linear path that leads from the generation of an information need 
to an information objective (Feinman et al. 1979). According to these de-
scriptions, the process of information seeking occurs in sequential stages, 
occurring from past to future, from generation of an information need 
to an ultimate information objective (Kuhlthau 1993). By contrast, more 
recent scholarship suggests that the process of information seeking is not 
bound chronologically. “Instead,” writes Salovainen, “information seeking 
is cumulative, reiterative, holistic and context bound” and characterized 
as “concurrent, continuous, cumulative, and looped cycles” (2006, 120). 
Solomon has suggested, for example, that the process of information seek-
ing, particularly in sense-making, does not follow the process of gathering 
information, processing that information, arranging or rejecting that in-
formation, and then applying the information to some task, decision, or 
question (1997). Salovainen (2006) suggests, via Solomon, that the pro-
cess is nonlinear, cyclical, recycling, and prone to false starts. In this way, 
the process of information seeking is not a sequence of events but a het-
erogeneous process of various temporal dimensions, a concept to which I 
will return in my analysis of online pornography.
Following McLuhan’s discussion of the clock, as soon as it became 
possible to fix time as something that happens between two points, time 
became divided into uniform, visualizable units, thus accounting for our 
sense of duration and impatience with the delay between events. Accord-
ing to McLuhan, “duration begins with the division of time” (2009, 157–
58). Bergson and Deleuze have critiqued this linear homogenous under-
standing of time as a cultural value system that neglects our understanding 
of the conjoined relationship between past and future. For Bergson,
Duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were, there 
would never be anything but the present—no prolonging of the past 
into the actual, no evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the 
continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which 
swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there 
is no limit to its preservation. (2002, 173)
Drawing on Bergson, Deleuze critiques our culture’s emphasis on the 
present:
We believe that a present is only past when it is replaced by another 
present. Nevertheless, let us stop and reflect for a moment: How would 
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a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same 
time that it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it 
were not past at the same time as present? The past would never be 
constituted if it had not been constituted first of all, at the same time 
that it was present. There is here, as it were, a fundamental position 
of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: The past is 
“contemporaneous” with the present that is has been. (1990, 58) 
For Bergson and Deleuze, past and present are not discrete moments on 
a linear scale but are conjoined and synthesized experiences of temporality.
Many of the above studies of information seeking treat time linearly, 
as a kind of external entity that has the potential to limit access to in-
formation, characterize the process of searching, or influence how and 
what one searches. Time is, thus, always perceived as an objective entity 
with its own internal rules, affecting and qualifying the search process 
itself. What these studies miss is the profoundly subjective nature of time, 
sometimes known as temporality. Whereas time is a condition through 
which the seeking process takes place, temporality is concerned with the 
quality or condition of being temporal. Temporality is an ontological and 
phenomenological question of one’s relation to time and how one experi-
ences time. Sobchack best discusses the difference between subjective and 
objective time:
We visibly perceive time as structured differently in its subjective and 
objective modes, and we understand that these two structures exist 
simultaneously in a demonstrable state of discontinuity as they are, 
nonetheless, actively and constantly synthesized in a specific lived-body 
experience (that is, a particular, concrete, and spatialized history and 
a particularly temporalized narrative. (2004, 150–51) 
Unlike Newtonian time, which primarily concerns itself with time as an 
entity or event that “flows,” I am concerned here with a transcendental 
understanding of time as an intellectual structure, in the tradition of Kant 
(2007) and Heidegger (2009).
From Absorption to “Disembodiment”
Many pornography websites provide an overflow of images and textual 
fragments, seemingly arranged in a rambling and chaotic fashion, op-
posed to concepts of ordering and system. Alongside the myriad of por-
nographic images on display, the sites also sometimes feature pop-ups, 
advertisements, flash and animated GIFs, accompanied by background 
music. Many pornography websites provide an enormous range of selec-
tion that seems to promise satisfaction. This concept of design participates 
in an aegis of “getting what you want” but in excess of it (Patterson, 2004, 
109). In this way, pornography websites promise the accessible and visible 
while delivering the curious and obscure. Such a method of display is an 
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aesthetic contrivance that draws the wonder, curiosity, surprise, and frus-
tration from the viewer (part of a baroque genealogy of display), creating 
differential relations between embodiment and technics by placing body 
and machine, sensation and concept, nature and artifice in ongoing rela-
tions of discordance and concordance with each other.
Following Barthes’s understanding of sexual cruising (1992), the goal 
of getting what you want in part allows the viewer to rationalize the plea-
sure of browsing pornography. To imagine the goal is to project into a mo-
ment of perfect satisfaction—obtaining the perfect image, one completely 
adequate to the viewer’s desire. Yet nothing can compare to an imagined 
perfect image, leaving every image inadequate. The nearly perfect image 
still only provides momentary satisfaction. Even if the viewer knows they 
are unlikely to find a better image, they continue to browse, forgoing the 
pleasures of the known for the pleasures of the unknown. The search con-
tinues. Satisfaction is illusive. In deferring satisfaction, desire reproduces 
itself as desire (Lacan 1992, 2007). Viewers constantly shift to new images, 
creating a process of browsing in which pleasure derives from the habitual 
and repetitious delay and deferral of satisfaction. As I say in my introduc-
tion, while the myth of the internet promises immediate gratification, the 
interface of online pornography necessitates delays, inscribing repetition 
and delays as pleasures of a different order.
The mechanisms through which one views online pornography insist 
on certain movements of the body, which become habit through repeti-
tion: pointing and clicking, pushing the refresh button, scrolling up and 
down, left and right, opening and closing windows, clicking back and for-
ward, right clicking, fast forwarding through scenes, slowing scenes down, 
and pausing a moving image, all of which requires moving the mouse to 
a precise point on a surface. Performing these gestures represents the 
pre-existing relation between body and machine. While these gestures 
might be seen as highly interactive, enabling control and manipulation 
of images, Mitzuko Ito (2005) has shown in her studies of interactional 
game design that, counterintuitively, the effect is to bring about states of 
absorptive automaticity, rather than reflective decision-making, blurring 
the boundaries between viewer and machine, viewer and image.
Masturbation is a good example (though certainly not the only one) 
of absorptive automaticity that collapses distinctions between subject and 
object. Unlike Schüll’s analysis of machine gambling—in which “the most 
extreme of machine gamblers speak of bodily exit, suggesting that ‘disem-
bodied’ is a more apt descriptor for their relationship with technology than 
‘embodied’” (2012, 174)—the pornographic experience is meaningful to 
viewers precisely because of their bodies. To the extent that it attempts 
to arouse sexual feelings, pornography functions in and through a direct 
visceral appeal to the body. Touching in pornography (the smooch of a 
kiss, the touch of a shoulder) becomes actualized as the touch of one’s self, 
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the autoaffective touch, much in the way Alfonso Lingis describes sensing 
one’s own sensuality (1993, 162), or Merleau-Ponty describes the sense of 
touch as diffused into the body (1964, 166). This form of self-touching is 
consciously other-directed, and as such, some might argue, it maintains 
the subject/object distinction because it is different from forms of self-
touching in which one’s body and one’s consciousness is self-directed. 
However, one’s consciousness is never entirely self-directed, for mastur-
bation demands special focus on an external, if also imaginary, figure of 
desire. It is precisely because one’s consciousness is not directed toward 
one’s own body but toward the figure onscreen that the subject and object 
remain interlaced rather than distinct. In such a moment, consciousness 
is diffuse, embodiment disbursed. The viewer is, according to Sobchack, 
“caught up without a thought (because [my] thoughts are ‘elsewhere’) 
in this vacillating and reversible structure that both differentiates and con-
nects the sense of my literal body to the sense of the figurative bodies and 
objects I see on the screen” (2004, 77)—a special formation to which I will 
return later in this essay.
Solicited by figural objects onscreen, viewers are not focused on the par-
ticularities of their own literal bodies either. A diffusion of the figural and 
literal reflects a diffusion of presence. In this context, the viewer’s percep-
tion of the figure on screen and their sense of self are vague, even as the in-
teraction heightens and intensifies their senses. At the moment one’s lived 
body, in rebound, senses itself in the online pornographic experience, 
the particular objects that sensually provoke the viewer are perceived in 
diffuse ways. One’s body is the site where the sensual event of representa-
tion occurs, where the sexual solicitation by the figure onscreen and one’s 
own self-touching becomes diffused into one’s body. Thus, the literal body 
and the figural bodies onscreen are both differentiated and connected, a 
dialectic of sexual engagement, and a hyperawareness of one’s own body 
and an absorption by the figural body onscreen. For Schüll, this is the mo-
ment at which “players do not act on the game, but become the game” by 
entering what she calls “the machine zone”: “a state in which alterity and 
agency recede” (2012, 175).
A form of autoeroticism in which one’s body and one’s consciousness 
are totally self-directed requires such cognitive reflection and attention 
toward oneself—what Sobchack calls a kind of “double reflexivity”—that 
it can and often does undo carnal pleasure. Sobchack points out how it 
is nearly impossible to tickle oneself, for self-consciousness of our laugh-
ing results in it becoming forced. The process of browsing pornography 
online collapses the distinction between object and subject insofar as 
browsing for sexual representation participates in perceptual “rebound.” 
At that moment, the search reflects sexual desire itself as necessarily other-
directed and requires an object other than oneself “so as to avoid a reflex-
ivity that is so doubled as to cause conscious reflection on sexual desire 
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itself” (Sobchack 2004, 78). Browsing pornography fails to be pleasurable 
at the moment it becomes consciously reflective; compulsive desire de-
pends on absorptive automaticity. In these moments, one does not think 
about one’s own body, thrust outside of the onscreen image. Instead, view-
ers are consumed by the image; they feel their bodies as only one side 
of “an irreducible and dynamic relational structure of reversibility and 
reciprocity” that has as its other side the figural body onscreen (Sobchack 
2004, 79). It is an immersive exchange that allows viewers actually to feel 
the warmth, moisture, and smoothness of a body.
Such an absorptive experience, as I will show throughout this essay, 
indicate a new form of temporal and spatial relation. To have lost track of 
time is to have lost awareness of the uniform units of time, to no longer fix 
time as something that happens between two points. Such is the power of 
absorption in the process of pleasurable searching: our subjective sense of 
time loses linearity. It is only when absorption has been interrupted, when 
one’s body is thrust out of the screen and back into one’s chair, that time 
comes into consciousness again. In these moments of absorption, one is 
abstracted from the objective and subjective discontinuity that gives mean-
ing to the temporal system past/ present/ future. Sobchack also calls this 
the “electronic instant” (2004, 158).
Given Schüll’s invocation of bodily exit, one might wonder if the body 
is lost in these moments of time-consuming absorptive activity. Can we 
describe this absorption of the body in the process of browsing porno-
graphic images as disembodiment? For Vivian Sobchack, electronic cul-
ture has occasioned, if not caused, a “crisis of the flesh” that de-centers 
the body’s material gravity. Sobchack fears that the body disappears into 
the technological apparatus as we increasingly live electronic lives (2004, 
161). By contrast, Mark B. N. Hansen characterizes out-of-body experi-
ence of absorption as disembodiment (2006). Yet Sobchack and Hansen, 
each in their own way, misrecognize diffused embodiment as disembodiment. 
I will introduce the concept of diffused embodiment shortly. But first, it’s 
productive to unpack how such prominent phenomenologists have come 
to believe that electronic technologies have left us without a body.
For her part, Sobchack begins with an understanding of how these 
transformations of temporality change the nature and quality of the space 
that we occupy as bodies. She describes electronic space, as distinct from 
cinematic and photographic space, as abstract and ungrounded, and la-
ments that such space can “no longer hold the interest of the spectator/ 
user but has to constantly simulate it” (2004, 158). She moves, curiously, 
toward an understanding of digital culture as marginalizing or trivializing 
the body. Sobchack writes:
Its flatness—a function of its lack of temporal thickness and bodily 
investment—has to attract spectator interest at the surface. To achieve 
this, electronic space has to construct objective and superficial equiva-
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lents to depth, texture, and invested bodily movements. Saturation of 
color and hyperbolic attention to detail replace depth and texture at 
the surface of the image, and constant action and the simultaneous and 
busy multiplicity of screens and images replace the gravity that ground 
and orients the movement of the lived body with a purely spectacular, 
kinetically, exciting, often dizzying sense of bodily freedom (and free-
dom from the body). (2004, 158)
For Sobchack, electronic presence has neither a point of view nor a vi-
sual situation, “such as we experience, respectively, with the photograph 
and the cinema” (2004, 159). Yet online pornography, as we have seen, 
is part of a larger network of communication that includes the televisual, 
audiovisual, cinematic, and photographic. Because online pornography 
is a media convergence, it is difficult for Sobchack to make clear distinc-
tions between the visual situations of electronic images, cinema, and the 
photograph.
Sobchack’s understanding of electronic presence assumes a complete 
break from the procedures of cinema and photography, one that creeps 
teleologically forward toward, not the promise of a new utopia, as some 
hyperbolic accounts of new media claim, but toward a kind of dystopia. 
Sobchack describes these “disembodying effects of electronic representa-
tion” as a “technological crisis of the flesh” (2004, 161). In this new tech-
nological culture, she argues for the lived body’s “existence and against its 
simulation or erasure. For, within the dominant cultural and techno-logic 
of the electronic there are those out there who prefer the simulated body 
and a virtual world” (2004, 161).
Sobchack’s argument about the loss of the body to electronic technol-
ogy echoes the panic about the prevalence and dangers of online pornog-
raphy from the time the World Wide Web became publically available, as 
prominently depicted in Time magazine’s cover story from July 3, 1995, in 
which the magazine shocked its readers with one of the first mass-media 
exposés on the dangers of online pornography (Elmer-Dewitt 1995). The 
cover features the face of a blond child with vacant eyes starring into the 
glow of a computer screen that lights his pale face.2 Patterson focuses on 
the illustrations that accompany the article, arguing that they reveal the vi-
sual tropes that, in succeeding decades, would become mobilized around 
the issue of internet pornography. One illustration depicts a naked man, 
his arms and legs wrapped around a keyboard and computer monitor, 
seeming to dissolve into the screen.
It is a visual rhetoric of anxiety specifically located at the rapidly evolv-
ing interface between corporeal body and computer screen. It is an 
anxiety concerning the possible lack of control and autonomy of that 
body when confronted with this technology. On the level of sexuality, 
it figures the relationship between the body and networked computer 
as peculiarly and unwholesomely dissolute. (Patterson 2004, 104)
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Sobchak’s fear of electronic technology dovetails with early fears about 
the internet as a vehicle for pornography. The similarity perhaps speaks 
to the long and complex relationship between new technologies and the 
pornography industry, which has been responsible for the development 
of a wide variety of media, including the Panoram, cable television, VCR, 
broadband, 3G mobile services, web hosting services, secure credit card 
processing, live chat, and banner advertisements, to name only a few (Ali-
lunas 2016).
Partly what makes Sobchack’s take on electronic culture so surprising 
is the way in which electronic images, for Sobchack, are somehow flatter 
and more superficial than cinematic or photographic images, constitut-
ing a complete break between old media and new. In her understanding, 
electronic images have a harder time holding the interest of the specta-
tor, lacking what she calls “temporal thickness” and “bodily investment” 
(2004, 158). As a result, for Sobchack, these images have to “simulate” 
depth, texture, and invested bodily movements. It is certainly true that 
the projection of the image is decentralized. Whereas the traditional cin-
ematic experience positions the projector centrally at the back of the the-
atre, and whereas the camera itself, aside from split screens, offers a single 
point of view, electronic images are less grounded and less hierarchical. 
They are part of a broad network of communication technologies, which, 
particularly with pornography, includes a dizzying array of images that 
bombard the spectator, as I described in the introduction. Yet it is dif-
ficult to see how, especially in light of online pornography, the flatness of 
electronic screens cannot hold the interest of the spectator. If anything, 
the pornographic experience, as I have shown, is meaningful to viewers 
precisely because of their bodies (Keilty 2016).
Mark B. N. Hansen, too, has considered “disembodiment” (what he 
sometimes also called the “tele-absent body” in relation to electronic cul-
ture. Hansen is concerned with the way relational architecture installa-
tions deploy interventions into existing architectural space precisely as a 
means of triggering embodied reactions. He writes,
When these reactions subsequently enter into resonance with the me-
dia transformations triggering them, they establish feedback loops in 
which embodiment and information mutually catalyze one another’s 
ongoing evolution, rendering it a coevolution that perfectly expresses 
the contemporary state of the technogenesis of the human. (2006, 95) 
For Hansen, these transformations of built urban space, which are collec-
tive individuations of embodied human actors, demonstrate that
embodiment today can only be conceived as collective individuation, as 
an individuation that requires a certain disembodiment of embodied 
individuals. The reason for this is simple: Because human embodiment 
no longer coincides with the boundaries of the human body, a disem-
 duration and desire/keilty 497
bodiment of the body forms the condition of possibility for a collective 
(re)embodiment through technics. (2006, 95) 
Hansen paradoxically calls these “indivisions” “embodied disembodi-
ments (or disembodied embodiment),” that is, “material extensions of the 
viewer’s embodied agency that, while remaining correlated with the latter, 
nonetheless function autonomously from it” (2006, 92). Hansen asks us to 
consider the interactive three-dimensional artwork Worskieng (Benayoun, 
n.d.). Wearing three-dimensional glasses, viewers enter a CAVE3 in which 
the virtual landscape, projected onto the CAVE through cameras, changes 
as the viewer walks through the space and takes photographs. Worskieng 
situates the viewer in a warzone, surrounded by sounds of war. Each time 
the viewer snaps a photograph, the viewer causes a disturbance of the land-
scape, sometimes destructive, sometimes erasing the landscape. In this 
way, one’s presence disturbs chaotic equilibrium and uses photography as 
a weapon of destruction and erasure.
The CAVE is a reference to Plato’s allegory of the cave, which contem-
plates perception, reality, and illusion. But it also attempts to give viewers 
what simulation demands—immersion. Hansen is interested in the ways 
in which digital landscapes, particularly those used by architects to model 
built urban environments, transform “correlatively but autonomously” to 
one’s body. In these environments, simulation absorbs viewers, and the en-
vironment changes according to signals sent by my body through feedback 
loops. For Hansen, such a moment is a form of “embodied disembodi-
ment” because while we are always embodied, we see the space transform-
ing correlatively with my body and yet autonomously from my body, which 
Hansen describes as a kind out-of-body experience, disembodiment or 
dematerialization of the body. To be sure, it is a disorienting, destabilizing, 
absorbing experience, made more dizzying when a group of individuals 
participate in such a simulation. Designers and artists of the CAVE have 
designed their environments with the body’s participation in mind, as 
seen in the design of Worskieng, which uses feedback loops from the body 
to alter a virtual environment, serving to further disorient, immerse, and 
absorb the viewer into the virtual landscape. I am, however never disem-
bodied in this electronic presence. Indeed, it is precisely because of my 
body that I feel disorientation, absorption, and immersion (Richmond 
2016). Perhaps Hansen’s only fault is a semantic one; he has misidentified 
feelings of immersion as disembodiment.4
Diffused Embodiment
I want to suggest, instead, that what Sobchack and Hansen attempt to 
describe is not disembodiment but what I am calling diffusion—a tempo-
rally and spatially inflected embodied experience. First, I want to make 
clear that not all feelings of disorientation, immersion, or absorption are 
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diffusion. I am not attempting to describe dizziness, a state of bewilder-
ment, or faintness, a state of exhaustion or a condition of being without 
strength. Nor am I attempting to describe the feeling of losing control of 
one’s body, swallowed up or engulfed by a computer á la Time magazine 
circa 1995. Instead, by diffusion, I am referring to the sensation of disper-
sion or distribution through space—that is, a decentering, destabilizing, 
ungrounding of the body’s material gravity, an experience that also char-
acterizes disorientation, immersion, and absorption, concepts that have 
been repeatedly used by Sobchack or Hansen to characterize the so-called 
“disembodied” experiences of electronic presence.
In the case of pornography, diffusion is the body’s capacity to sense 
itself, to feel its heat, to feel adrenaline, the moment when subject and 
object conjoin and one is sensually provoked by the body on screen to feel 
one’s own body, collapsing the spatial distinctions of “here” and “there,” 
which I describe above in my analysis of masturbation. Indeed, Sobchack 
has commented on the way in which temporality extends our presence 
spatially and displaces us both here and there (2004, 151). It is in these 
moments one’s body is both correlative with the body on screen and yet 
autonomous to it, as Hansen describes, a sensual feedback loop.
Distinctions can be made, of course, between the concepts of disorien-
tation, absorption, and immersion. Applying even the slightest phenom-
enological pressure to these concepts, however, reveals that the distinc-
tions are not as clear as we might presume. We colloquially use the words 
interchangeably to describe similar sensations. One can be immersed, ab-
sorbed, consumed, engrossed, preoccupied in an activity—different ways 
of describing disorientation. My understanding of disorientation takes 
from Sara Ahmed: “If we know where we are when we turn this way or 
that, then we are oriented. We have our bearings” (2006, 1). Paradoxi-
cally, however, if one is immersed in an activity, then one is oriented to-
ward a certain object, a cognitive process of concentration and focus. 
What makes the sensation of diffusion somewhat paradoxical, then, is its 
dual oriented/ disoriented nature. When we are immersed in an activ-
ity, we lose a conscious sense of our larger environment, our “thoughts 
are elsewhere.” Our lived body’s material gravity becomes decentralized 
and destabilized. Space and time come to have no cognitively real or as-
signable boundaries. Diffused into the image onscreen, the viewer is both 
here and there, a common trope of classic cinematic spectatorship. It is 
a sensation of space and time in suspension, until we are thrust out of the 
desiring scene, back into our chairs. At that point of intrusion, we become 
conscious once again of both time and space. Diffusion, then, is the sensa-
tion of elsewhere-ness or lost-ness when seeking pornography online. It is the 
body’s immersion into the desiring scene and the momentary suspension 
of time and space. The body is primary in this experience. Therefore, it is 
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not an experience of disembodiment. Instead, it is a sensation of diffused 
embodiment.
The Temporality of Computer Habits
Diffused embodiment—in disrupting both uniform units of time and the 
body’s material gravity—is one example of a nonlinear, heterogeneous 
temporality in the process of seeking and browsing online. Massumi 
(2002) has shown that habits and skills of the body also disrupt a linear 
concept of embodiment. In the case of seeking pornography online, these 
habits and skills, include pointing and clicking, pushing the refresh but-
ton, scrolling up and down, left and right, opening and closing windows, 
clicking back, typing on the keyboard, waiting for pages to open, waiting 
for videos to buffer, waiting for images to download, waiting for websites to 
prompt my action, clicking forward, right clicking, or moving the mouse 
to such-and-such a point on a surface. For Massumi, habits are evidence 
that the body is not simply in a present that moves from the past to the 
future. Instead, the body is part of a past-future that continually moves 
through the present. Massumi writes:
The problem is that if the body were all and only in the present, it 
would be all and only what it is. Nothing is all and only what it is. A 
body present is in dissolve: out of what it is just ceasing to be, into what 
it will already have become by the time it registers that something has 
happened. The present smudges the past and the future. (200) 
In this way, following Henri Bergson, Massumi shows that the past and 
future are not just strung-out punctual presents. “They are continuous 
dimensions contemporaneous to every present—which is by nature a 
smudged becoming, not a point state,” Massumi writes (200). If the body 
were only here and now, then it could not have developed habits and 
skills, for it would be cut off from its past experiences. A body could not 
remember and, thus, could not apply these habits and skills to a future or 
potential. Indeed, these habits and skills represent a pastness primed in 
the present for a future. “Most of all,” writes Massumi, “how could a body 
change? Where would it find change if it did not have the resources for 
it already within itself? A body does not coincide with its present. It coin-
cides with its potential. The potential is the future-past potential with every 
body’s change” (200).
The habits and skills of browsing pornography online are part of a 
muscular memory learned through previous repetition that continuously 
repeats in a present online browsing process motivated by the potential 
of an imagined perfect image that will satisfy one’s desire. In these mo-
ments, my body does not coincide with a cognizable point of here and 
now. A Euclidean space and linear time excludes both muscular memory 
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and potentiality in the passing present. It also denies that the computer 
technologies with which we interact also change. Computer technologies 
carry their continuities and their potentials when we engage with them, 
while simultaneously grounding and structuring our temporal and spatial 
experience.
Indeed, the habits and skills we use to browse the internet develop ac-
cording to the computer’s spatial, temporal, bodily, and technical coor-
dinates. The material demands of computers form what Sobchack calls 
“existential habits” (2004, 120). Sobchack cites Daniel Chandler to show 
the ways in which the relationship between ourselves and writing tools 
structure our experience of time and space. “Since, as phenomenologists 
have argued,” Chandler writes, “such relationships are fundamental to 
our structuring of experience, it is hardly surprising that they may be ex-
perienced as transforming influences” (1992, 92). Sobchack explains the 
different spatial formations she experiences while using different tech-
nologies for writing: “Even in school, under the monitoring eyes of others, 
writing by hand with pencil or pen was a private, enclosed, and intimate 
experience of material and social emergence—one that encompassed and 
protected a world from intrusion as it simultaneously extruded and ex-
pressed it” (2004, 115). Sobchack contrasts her experience of writing with 
a pen and pencil to writing with a typewriter: “Writing at the typewriter felt 
a less private experience; sitting at the machine somehow demanded a cor-
respondent spatial accommodation of the concrete and artificial quality 
of the room itself: the sheets of paper next to me, the furniture and books 
surrounding me” (115). In each of these experiences, Sobchack reveals 
the ways in which writing technologies differently ground and structure 
her spatial experience, from privacy and enclosure toward an awareness 
of the room in which she writes.
Yet it is Sobchack’s experience of writing at a computer that I wish to 
use as a springboard for my own spatial analysis of browsing pornography 
online. Sobchack writes,
My experience at the computer is more tunnel-like than shell-like, 
more blindered, occluded, and abstract than expansively material and 
physical. Its intimate space is less one of intrusion and extrusion than 
of exclusion, its physical sense is less that of impression and expression 
than of nearly effortless and immaterial exchange in which my body 
seems more diffuse—my head and the screen vaguely if intensely con-
joined, my hands and fingers and the keyboard and the mouse lightly 
felt peripherals to a less than solidly felt core. (2004, 115) 
Sobchack describes how electronic technology gives rise to particular spa-
tial forms (albeit, for her, in always decorporialized ways). To the extent 
that diffused embodiment in the process of browsing pornography online 
carries with it the paradox of both being oriented toward the object of 
my desire and being disoriented (or unaware of) my surroundings, the 
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experience is tunnel-like. In this sense, embodied diffusion can be de-
scribed as an experience of tunnel vision. However, Sobchack’s simile of 
the tunnel suggests as well that the spatial formation takes the shape of 
a cylinder, one in which I can move only linearly. Instead, the process 
of seeking pornography online gives rise to a nonlinear, nongeometric, 
non-Euclidean spatial formation, one that cannot be described in rigidly 
three-dimensional terms. I experience a shapeless spatial formation dur-
ing moments of diffused embodiment. That my body’s material gravity has 
become decentralized and destabilized, that time and space have no real 
or assignable boundaries suggests that diffused embodiment is an experi-
ence of space and time as spread out infinitely, not only in a unidirectional 
way, but in all directions.
This can be seen through existential habits like clicking through con-
tent online ad infinitum. This movement through digital space is nonlin-
ear because, following Timothy Murray, the visual overflow of images de-
centers viewers as visual centers for perspective. For Murray, viewers are 
the “relayer, transmitter, and receiver of imagistic flow rather than the 
ultimate soul of perspective or the figural center and source of visual il-
lumination” (2008, 46). Pornographic images have often been arranged 
in a rambling and chaotic fashion, in which we experience an informa-
tion overflow—inundated with images, pop-ups, flash animation, and ani-
mated GIFs, what Deleuze calls the “incessant stream of images” (1989, 
267). Murray continues, “Just as digital information systems enhance the 
intensity of this flow, their displacement of thinking subjectivity by the 
wonder of data accumulation evoked the very ideal of information that 
Walter Benjamin argued to be fundamental to the Baroque: the process of 
storing and schemata to which the emergent libraries of the seventeenth 
century were a monument” (2008, 46). Our vision and subjective experi-
ence is split among a variety of information overflows as we sort through 
the arrangement, databases, and seeming infinitude of pornography im-
ages online.
We move backwards, forwards and diagonally in all directions when 
browsing online. In moments of diffused embodiment, we jump from one 
screen to another, from one image to another, nonlinearly and multidi-
rectionally. To jump between screens evinces the ungrounded experience 
of viewing pornography online. Our movement through digital space is 
imbued with multiple moments of temporal and spatial suspension.
While Sobchack is right that we do not leave an impression within digi-
tal space the same as we might while writing or printing on a piece of pa-
per, it would be inaccurate to say that our experience within digital space 
does not involve expression or that it involves exclusion. To say that digital 
spatial formations exclude expression neglects new media art, web design, 
and the very act of writing in which I am engaged on my word processor at 
this very moment. To say that digital spatial formations involve exclusion 
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neglects the vast network of sexual sociability of online pornography, in 
which viewers are invited to participate in a community of masturbators—
or the countless other ways in which the internet has been made a pro-
foundly social experience (e.g., social networking sites). It also neglects 
the exposure of the computer screen in a public place. While much of 
pornography is probably viewed in private (albeit publicly broadcast), 
computer screens in public spaces, particularly on mobile devices, often 
invite glances and glares that constitute, neither direct involvement nor 
exclusion, but a form of passive or bystander involvement, a spatial forma-
tion that is both public and private but also both here and there, part of 
the space but not actively involved in it.
Narrative Temporality
The narrative arc of pornographic movies online creates a sense of expec-
tation and duration that also disrupts temporal linearity and teleology. 
Viewing and browsing, like reading, as Serantes (2016) has shown, has 
temporal and spatial dimensions. The experience of browsing and watch-
ing pornographic movies online is perpetual and recursive. This partly 
owes to the fact that viewers don’t seek out and watch pornography online 
for a specific “ending.” Following Lacan (1992), viewers rationalize the 
pleasure of seeking by imagining the goal of perfect satisfaction—obtain-
ing the perfect image, one completely adequate to the viewer’s desire. 
Viewers constantly jump to new images, creating a process of seeking in 
which pleasure derives from the habitual and repetitious delay and defer-
ral of satisfaction. In this way, browsing pornography online constitutes a 
recursive and perpetual temporal experience, in which an “ending,” like 
satisfaction, is an illusive temporal category as well as an illusive figural 
place in which to stop browsing.
In addition, many pornographic videos have a limited narrative frame-
work, thereby extending the imaginative possibilities (of fantasy narra-
tives) that viewers might project onto the video. This is especially true 
in online pornography, where the narrative form of pornographic videos 
is made even less continuous by only giving viewers access to short clips 
of longer pornographic movies. The existence of short clips partly owes 
to the material limits of computer memory/ space in streaming videos 
online. The limited size of most random-access memory (RAM), or com-
puter storage space, on home computers does not “buffer” longer videos 
as quickly as shorter videos, which require less random-access memory. 
“Buffering” occurs when the computer is unable to process the flow of 
digital data that carries the video at the same rate of occurrence that the 
events of the video should transpire to us in “real time.” “Real time” is a 
narrative technique in which the events depicted within the video take 
place entirely within the span of the depiction and at the same rate. When 
the computer cannot buffer data as fast as the flow of data, the narrative is 
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often disrupted, creating a stagnated sequence of events, a discontinuous 
narrative of stops and starts.
Buffering is a defeat of expectations that disrupts temporal linearity 
and intensifies eventual visibility. Intensity increases through the potenti-
ality of disruption and discontinuity as viewers are held in suspense and 
anticipation (even expectation) of disruption, discontinuity, and sexual 
climax. Massumi writes:
Intensity would seem to be associated with non-linear processes: reso-
nation and feedback that momentarily suspend the linear progress of 
the narrative present from past to future. Intensity is qualifiable as an 
emotional state, and that state is static—temporal and narrative noise. 
It is a state of suspense, potentiality of disruption. . . . It is not exactly 
passivity because it is filled with motion, resonation. And yet it is not 
activity, because the motion is not the kind that can be directed (if only 
symbolically) toward practical ends in a world of constituted aims and 
objectives (if only on screen). (2002, 25) 
It is important to remember that while the nonlinear processes associated 
with intensity are not teleological object-oriented forms of browsing on-
line, they are also motivated by the viewer’s desire for sexual satisfaction. 
Such intensity, according to Massumi, enhances an image’s effect on the 
viewer. Thus, narration, duration, and expectation combine in browsing 
online pornography to create a nonlinear, nonteleological, discontinuous 
temporal formation that intensifies the pleasure (and frustration) of the 
seeking and viewing experience.
Intensity is indeed associated with nonlinear processes, even as it is as-
sociated with linear temporal experiences, such as expectation. To the 
extent that expectation anticipates what comes next in a progression, to 
the extent that expectation projects into the future an anticipated occur-
rence or goal, expectation is a linear process and experience. In such 
an experience, viewers have not lost track of time. Indeed, viewers track 
time linearly toward a future occurrence. One is waiting for something or 
forecasting something to happen. Doing so requires an awareness of past 
and present in a linear way: something has happened and one is at present 
waiting for something to happen.
Insofar as intensity and suspense constitute an affective overflow of the 
linear processes of expectation, they can be distinguished from and in-
terlinked with expectation. Massumi has described such an experience as 
both superlinear and linear (2002, 26). According to Massumi, it is the sus-
pension of invariance that distinguishes the affective overflows of suspense 
and intensity with the invariance of expectation. He describes the phe-
nomenon of affective overflow simultaneous with linear flow this way: “As 
if an echo of irreducible excess, of gratuitous amplification, piggybacked 
on the reconnection to progression, bringing a tinge of the unexpected, 
the lateral, the unmotivated, to lines of action and reaction. A change in 
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the rules” (27). When moments of excessive affect, such as intensity and 
suspension, accompany linear expectation, one experiences time in the 
process of anticipation as both linear and above, beyond, or besides linear-
ity. Thus, the process of anticipating the imagined perfect image is both 
linear and superlinear. Browsing for an imagined perfect image intensifies 
and becomes increasingly suspenseful the greater we expect (or the closer 
we believe we are coming) to find that image and experience pure sexual 
satisfaction. Yet, as we have seen, the process is always left unfulfilled, and 
we are forever approaching, forever coming closer but never arriving at an 
end. I am in a state of arrivant: awaiting with suspense, expectant intensity, 
or intense expectation. I experience suspense above, beyond, or beside 
expectation. Indeed, it is the linearity of expectation upon which suspense 
intensifies. In other words, it is the increased expectation of something 
happening that affectively overflows into suspense.
The distinction between expectation and the sensations of suspense 
and intensity turns on reflection and cognition. For Massumi, sensation 
involves a “‘backward referral of time’—in other words . . . sensation is 
organized recursively before being linearized, before it is redirected out-
wardly to take its part in a conscious chain of actions and reactions” (2002, 
28). Accordingly, suspense and intense expectation turn inward and are 
folded into the body,
except that there is no inside for it to be in, because the body is radi-
cally open, absorbing impulses quicker than they can be perceived, 
and because the entire vibratory event is unconscious, out of mind. Its 
anomaly is smoothed over retrospectively to fit conscious requirements 
of continuity and linear causality. (Massumi 2002, 29) 
Intense expectation and suspense become linearized and reduced to ra-
tional expectation when they are consciously reflected upon. The process 
of writing about such sensation, in which I am engaged, is a process of lin-
earization because retrospection requires a linear causality of events. Part 
of what makes suspense and intensity superlinear is the extent to which 
they are processes that suspend time through absorption into anticipa-
tion, even as they participate in and rely on linear expectation. It is the 
seeming permanence of arrivant (always expecting, always arriving, always 
coming) that intensifies suspense and frustrates the browsing process. In-
deed, Sobchack claims that electronic presence is bound up in “impatient 
desire,” and, of course, impatience is the frustration of relentless desire or 
expectation (2004, 153). Such permanence, such a lasting continuance 
of time is the definition of duration.5 In the case of online pornography, it 
is the time during which browsing continues and the time during which 
we anticipate eventual visibility of an imagined perfect image. Thus, one 
continually dwells in duration and experiences a temporally interlinking 
linearity and superlinearity in browsing for pornography online.
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Finally, it is noteworthy, too, that these clips frequently, though not 
always, depict the movie’s sexual climax, cutting much of the narrative 
from the scene. This serves to further extend the imaginative possibilities 
of narrative that surround the sexual climax by providing an even more 
limited narrative framework upon which a viewer might project a fantasy 
narrative. It is rarely the case that the sexual climax is also the narrative 
climax. In most pornographic movies, the narrative content continues 
for at least a short time after the scene of orgasm. Part of what makes 
the sexual climax desirable is the ability for viewers to project a narrative 
through the moment of sexual climax, rather than having sexual climax 
mark a complete break with a projected fantasy narrative. Moreover, the 
narrative arch of online pornographic videos is made less continuous and 
temporally linear by the fact that viewers control the pace and direction of 
the movie. Viewers can start, stop, replay, fast-forward, or rewind the video 
through the perpetual habits of engaging with the computer.
These short clips digitally manifest nonlinearity through the editing 
of time-based footage nonsequentially. In this way, according to Munster, 
“multiple versions of the past can co-exist with the present and be acces-
sible from any given moment” (2006, 100). These clips frequently chop-
up the linear sequence of events of a larger pornographic movie, and 
viewers do not always find the clips in sequential order when browsing an 
adult video hosting service (e.g., PornHub). Indeed, Munster has charac-
terized digital time as sequential and nonsequential variation (173). Time 
is sensed in the browsing of these videos as “not primarily successive in-
stants but is composed of non-linear periods and cycles” (100). This is 
especially true when viewers find video clips that overlap and repeat the 
narrative sequence of the larger narrative, or when the sequence of events 
have been rearranged even with a single short clip. Taken as a whole, the 
clips of a larger pornographic video represent different edits of past and 
present together and unfold different moments. Munster refers to such a 
phenomenon as “multiple co-existing sequences of time” (100). Viewers 
can also reaccess and repeat these clips, reordering them to affect the out-
come of the longer video’s narrative. In this way, temporality has become 
dispersed through the lack of narrative coherence.
For Munster, these nonlinear sequences of time affect the existential 
habits and skills of engaging with the computer and internet, involving 
“a new habituation for the body and contributes to the formation of new 
kinds of motor-sensory memories. The digital production of virtual time 
can therefore be said to operate multimodally. Temporality is sequentially 
compressed and yet new types of rhythms become part of the virtual expe-
rience” (2006, 100). Often, the intentional narrative of the longer video is 
unknown to viewers while they design their own discontinuous narrative 
through a simple click of the mouse, jumping from one clip to another, 
starting and stopping the sequence of events at one’s desire. In this way, 
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viewers’ existential habits create new rhythms and flows in the browsing 
experience. Jumping from one clip to another, piecing together a narra-
tive, viewers are not stretching out a flattened instant or creating a incon-
sistent sequence of events but extending a moment of one’s projected 
narrative. Viewers therefore move sideways through narrative, rather 
than backwards or forwards. “It is perhaps this lateral rearrangement,” 
writes Munster, “that accounts for the extended present moment as the 
frequently experienced duration of digital time.” In this way, time is “com-
pacted into stacked and varying rhythms” (101). Indeed, the process of 
jumping from clip to clip underscores an existence of multiple durations 
that become compacted and form the rhythm of and within the extended 
moment of one’s projected narrative. This kind of time—an extended 
moment of multiple durations and a disorganization of the sequencing of 
events and repeating of events to create an inconsistent narrative—is radi-
cally different from the teleological linearity of objective time. Sobchack 
best describes the discontinuity and multiplicity of electronic time this 
way: “The regulative strictures and linear teleology of objective time now 
seem to turn back in on themselves recursively in a nonlinear structure of 
equivalence and reversibility” (2004, 156–57).
The ability of viewers to manipulate the narrative and temporal se-
quence of events of pornographic clips online reveals the way viewers 
as participants actively engage in playing with time in browsing for por-
nography online. Murray has described the ways in which viewer-partic-
ipants activate time in his analysis of new media CD-ROMs: “Time is not 
so much experienced cinematically as a passing of time or recollection 
of memory,” writes Murray, “but is activated, as Deleuze might say, as the 
play or thought of temporality” (2008, 202). Distinct from classic accounts 
of cinematic time, which involves a present informed by a narrative of 
collective past events and an expansive future, electronic time involves a 
present informed by the passing present of existential habits and skills.6 In 
browsing pornography online, viewers can play with time through these 
existential habits and skills. For example, the ability to pause or freeze 
the pornographic moving image with a click of a mouse allows viewers 
to manipulate the time and narrative of the image and the temporal ex-
perience of browsing online. We can therefore select any moment from 
the moving image and manipulate its temporal structure and, in turn, 
our own relation to that image, from a relation grounded in the value of 
streaming forward to a relation grounded in the value of possession and 
“presentness” (Sobchack 2004, 157).7 In this way, viewers experience time 
as something malleable, although not necessarily something viewers can 
completely control. Indeed, however much viewers might play with time, 
time in the browsing process is always already structured and grounded 
through passing present, anticipation, expectation, diffused embodiment, 
duration, delay, and sensations.
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Conclusion
This essay has expanded our understanding of time within information 
studies to include temporality, that is, the quality or condition of being 
temporal. The experience of subjective time does not adhere easily to be-
haviorist, positivist, or quantitative modes of description that are prevalent 
among scholars of information-seeking scholarship. As a result, this es-
say has relied upon formal analysis guided by existential phenomenology 
to treat time as a profoundly and fundamentally subjective experience, 
grounded in our embodied encounters with pornography and the techno-
logical apparatus of the computer. The process of browsing pornography 
online has the capacity to transform our temporal existence and alter our 
subjectivity.
Temporality, in the process of seeking pornography online, is a mul-
tivariant experience. It consists of multimodal, superlinear, linear, non-
linear, backward, compressed, discontinuous, unstable, diffused, and dis-
bursed subjective experiences of time in our encounters with computer 
technologies. These different forms of time can be experienced sometimes 
together, sometimes separately, but always cohering in the body and con-
stituting embodied existence. In this context, time has not been treated as 
an entity or event external to ourselves, as an object, with its own internal 
rules of flow, affecting an external browsing process. Leisure activities, of 
which browsing pornography is a part, partly grounds and structures time 
in the browsing process as the duration of opportunity to participate in a 
pleasurable activity. Its close association with duration can also be seen in 
the delay and deferral of satisfaction that rationalizes the process of brows-
ing pornography online. Duration also characterizes moments of diffused 
embodiment, when we are lost in thought, without the cognitive reflection 
on discernable boundaries of time and space. These moments reveal the 
body’s capacity to sense itself in a process that conjoins subject and object, 
disrupting linear time and Euclidean space by being lost in thought and 
by being diffused with the image on screen.
The skills and habits of engaging with computer technologies also re-
flect the ways in which the material demands that technology ground our 
experience of time and space in browsing for pornography online, decen-
tering the body’s material gravity and imbuing movement through digital 
space with multiple durations. The narrative arc of pornographic moving 
images and their distribution online through short clips serve to disrupt 
linear temporality by multiplying moments of climax and allowing viewers 
actively to engage in playing with time in browsing pornography online.
Notes
1. This close association between frustration and pleasure echoes Freud’s concept of cathexis. 
For Freud (1927), the psychic energy found in the id, which is responsible for satisfying 
basic needs and desires, invests itself in an object, idea, or person in order to satisfy that 
desire. Freud represented frustration in libidinal desires as a blockage of psychic energies 
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that have, or would eventually have, built up and require release in alternative ways, usually 
through fixation and the enjoyment of sexual objects (“object-cathexes”). Pornography 
is an object-cathexis, intensified by the delay of the technological apparatus. 
2. This iconography seems inspired from John Carpenter’s Village of the Damned (1995), which 
premiered only a few months earlier. It brings together the promises of the internet as 
global village with the iconography of a cyber-village of the damned. The following year, 
then-first lady Hillary Clinton would publish It takes a Village (1996), which focuses on the 
impact individuals and groups outside the family have on children. These cultural artifacts 
speak to a panic around the prevalence of pornography online as part of the broader 
American “Culture Wars” in the 1990s, and specifically what impact it has on bodies and 
children. For more on this particular cultural moment, see Wendy Chun (2006). 
3. Cave Automatic Virtual Environment 
4. Hansen’s CAVE example does not demonstrate his point, since the experience remains 
centered in a single subject’s experience. A constructivist perspective undercuts the foun-
dations upon which he makes his supposed distinction.
5. See Old English Dictionary, s.v. “duration,” accessed June 17, 2017, http://dictionary.oed 
.com/cgi/entry/50071018?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=duration&first=1&
max_to_show=10. 
6. Sobchack (2004) characterizes cinematic time as something that exists simultaneously 
with objective time, demonstrating a state of discontinuity that is nevertheless coherent. 
7. In comparing the temporal experience of the cinema with that of the photograph, Sob-
chack writes, “The significant value of the streaming forward that informs the cinematic 
with its specific form of temporality (and differentiates it from the atemporality of the 
photographic) is intimately bound to a structure not of possession, loss, pastness, and 
nostalgia but of accumulation, ephemerality, presentness, and anticipation— to a presence 
in the present informed by its connection to a collective past and an expansive future” 
(2004, 151). I would add, however, that futurity and anticipation also structure the temporal 
experience of searching pornography online.
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